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Survival Strategies and Characteristics of Start-Ups:
An Empirical Study from the New Zealand IT Industry

S. Almeida
Department of Work and Organizational Studies, The University of Sydney
M. Fernando
School of Management and Marketing, The University of Wollongong

Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to report the findings of an exploratory study on the
characteristics of New Zealand start up IT firms that survived the dot.com collapse.
The paper is based on the in-depth interviews of nine entrepreneurs of start-up IT
firms in New Zealand. The findings reveal how moderate strategy types influence
survival, and what core organizational characteristics influenced the realisation of
these strategies. These findings indicate that the firms that survived projected
characteristics of holistic strategic balance, mastering resources and unifying focus.
Successful firms made purposeful choices on resource allocations and realized
moderately simple strategies. In contrast, firms that failed projected a general lack
of strategic balance, mastering and trade off. These firms’ organizational themes
realized excessively complex strategies with no distinct focus.

1. Introduction
Why did so many ‘promising’ start-up IT firms fall short of expectations? Did their
downfall have anything to do with over diversification? The purpose of this paper
is to report the findings of an exploratory study of the distinct characteristics of
New Zealand start up IT firms that survived the dot.com collapse. To understand
the characteristics of the surviving IT start-up firms, it is important to understand
the firms’ strategic scope and typical activities because they influence the strategies
pursued by a firm.

1

The body of strategy making literature suggests that strategic scope includes three
elements: product scope, market scope and industry scope. According to Grant
(2002), product scope is based on the question “how broad a range of products
should the firm supply” while the market scope is “the geographical scope that a
firm serves” (Grant, 2002: 72). In relation to industry scope, economists define
industry as “a group of firms that supplies a market” (in Grant, 2002a: 86).
Accordingly, industry scope can be defined as “the range of related industries in
which the firm competes with a co-ordinated strategy” (Porter, 1985: 54). For
example, an IT firm may provide mobile data solutions to the telecommunication
industry, fast moving consumer goods industry and the banking industry by
adopting uniquely co-ordinated strategies within each industry to suit their
individual industry product requirements. In this paper, strategic scope will be
assumed to be a combination of product, industry and geographical and market
scope.

A firm’s activities provide an important clue to answer the question “where does
the firm compete” (Grant, 2002). According to Porter (1985: 36), “every firm is a
collection of activities that are performed to design, produce, market, deliver and
support its products. All these activities can be represented using a value chain”.
The value chain consists of “the physically and technologically distinctive activities
a firm performs” (Porter, 1985: 35). These can be divided into primary and support
activities. Primary activities are “the activities involved in the physical creation of
the product and its sale and transfer to the buyer as well as after sales assistance”
(Porter, 1985: 38). The support activities are those activities that “support primary
activities and each other by providing purchased inputs, technology, human
resources and various firm-wide functions” (Porter, 1985: 38).

2. Strategies and performance implications
Based on the above two dimensions (strategic scope and activity configuration) the
literature points to two distinctive realised strategy types. The first strategy type is
when firms pursue an overall broad strategic scope with related broad activity
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configurations (resulting in realising complex strategies). In the second strategy
type, firms pursue an overall narrow strategic scope with related narrow activity
configuration (resulting in realising simple strategies). However, when firms pursue
a combination of an extremely limited strategic scope with related activity
configuration, these firms tend to realise excessively simple strategies. Miller
(1993) indicates that firms pursuing such excessively simple strategies may
“ultimately come to rely on too narrow a set of customers products, and issues”
(Miller, 1992b: 28). Furthermore, these firms “risk fairly rapid extinction in the
event of a major market shift [due to] its gambling on the continued viability of its
limited set of products and markets” (Miles, Snow, Meyer, & Coleman, 1978: 39).

Similarly, firms can become too complex by attempting to serve an excessively
broad strategic scope with an excessively broad activity configuration. For
example, according to Ansoff (1965), when a firm pursues a broad strategic scope
such as the “transportation business”, these firms are unable to provide a “common
thread” that is “a relationship between present and future product-markets which
would enable outsiders to perceive where the firm is heading” (Ansoff, 1965:105).
As a result, firms that “thrive by aggressively diversifying often become too
complex, fragmented and thinly spread to be effective” (Miller, 1992b: 28).

Then we can assume that when firms avoid overly excessive or restrictive strategic
scope, these firms realise moderate strategies. Consequently, since overly excessive
or simple strategy types are linked with poor organizational performance levels,
then we can also assume that moderate strategies are more suited for survival.
However, what is not clear is which characteristics cause IT start-up firms to pursue
moderate strategies. Before we identify these, it is important to understand the
research context, the New Zealand IT industry. It is to this that we now turn.
3. The information technology industry and entrepreneurship in New
Zealand
According to Monsted and Jensen (2001), information technology (IT) is:
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“… an art and not a science. It is the combination of different
skills and networks, which form the firm. You cannot in this
field develop a prototype, and then try to sell. This is not
possible. You have to be close to the market, and know the
needs and the possible prices and avoid the linear thinking.
You have to be able to live with uncertainty”
(Monsted and Jensen, 2001: 2)

High-tech firms operate in uncertain and volatile environments, where
technologies, competitive boundaries, and market conditions change continuously
(Bahrami and Evans, 1989; Marksman, Balkin and Schjedt, 2001). Similarly,
Eisenhardt and Sull state that (2001) high-tech industries portray characteristics of
intense rivalries, constantly evolving strategies, instant imitators, and few barriers
to entry. As such, the information technology industry can be considered as a
segment of the high tech industry sharing similar characteristics. High-tech industry
is faced with the concept of ‘winner takes most’ and therefore, these firms need to
operate on a mission orientation rather than on a production orientation (Arthur,
1996). Typically, high tech firms rely on tacit knowledge-based resources such as
employee talents, ideas and expertise rather than physical assets (Brush, Greene
and Hardt, 2001).

There is also an observable trend of increasing returns to scale in high tech
industries (Arthur, 1996). This is because, even though the up-front cost of
operations is high initially, as sales increase, the unit cost tends to fall. Thus when a
product gains prevalence, it is likely to emerge as an industry standard. This occurs
when clients invest in training of that particular product and keep updating their
skills on the new revisions of the product. In such an industry, it pays to be the first
and to have the best technology (Arthur, 1996). At the same time, although the IT
industry may have brought a few major success stories like Yahoo and Microsoft,
the attractiveness, may be more long-term than generally considered. Typically,
bankruptcies occur on sixty percent of the high tech companies that succeed in
getting venture capital (Nesheim, 2000). The high-tech industry is also known to
have the highest number of “landmines and goldmines” (Nesheim, 2000). These
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‘landmines and goldmines’ have considerable economic and social consequences
on the New Zealand economy.

New Zealand entrepreneurial firms employ fifty five percent of the full-time
workforce (Statistics New Zealand, February 2001). This indicates the importance
of entrepreneurial firms to the New Zealand economy. Due to the geographical
isolation of New Zealand, these firms are well equipped with survival mechanisms
(Campbell-Hunt, 2001). There is a strong sense of rugged individualism in the New
Zealand culture that promotes self-employment and all-round management of their
own businesses (McGregor and Gomes, 1999).

According to a study of successful entrepreneurial firms in New Zealand
(Campbell-Hunt, 2001), entrepreneurial leaders are generally exposed to many
overseas markets and cultures. These successful entrepreneurs have high levels of
enthusiasm, energy and were resilient in the face of failure. They give their utmost
priority to their employees and establish long-term relationships based on trust,
goodwill, integrity and show core interdependence.

On the negative side, even though these entrepreneurs are technically well versed in
their own field or trade, their entrepreneurial culture exhibits a lack of overall
management skills that are necessary to run successful businesses (Bollard, 1998).
This may be aggravated by the fact that small firm owner-managers are often
responsible for all facets of firm operations (McGregor and Gomes, 1999). As a
result, irrespective of whether these owner entrepreneurs possess adequate skills,
they act as general managers, finance managers, human resource managers and
production managers for their business. Similarly, there is an observable
widespread reluctance in New Zealand to embrace the concept of world-class
achievement and to pursue excellence (Birchfield, 2001).

4. Methodology
This study aims to examine the distinct characteristics of New Zealand start up IT
firms that survived the dot.com collapse. It will examine how moderate versus
5

excessive strategy types influence survival, and what core organizational
characteristics influenced the realisation of these strategies. The research tactics
used in this study is grounded on the case study methodology.

The case study methodology is a useful research framework to overcome problems
of resistance to survey methods and smallness of the sample size (Chetty, 1998).
The case study method enabled us to assess holistic patterns of social phenomena in
real life situations (Numagami, 1998). In addition, we also considered that “the
evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling and the overall
study is therefore regarded as being more robust” (Yin, 1984: 52). As such,
multiple-case study method enabled us to gain a better understanding of the
research issues. Similarly, a multiple case study approach helped us to study
patterns common to cases avoiding chance associations (Chetty, 1998). Each case
was treated individually, yet patterns were analysed through cross-case
comparisons.

In addition, we used secondary data such as newspaper articles, web site
information, brochures and other public records relating to the firm to supplement
the in-depth interviews. This form of triangulation “reflects an attempt to secure an
in depth understanding of the phenomenon in question” (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994:
2).

4.1 Data collection
The primary method of data collection was in-depth interviews. These were
conducted with founders of firms and/or their senior management. Each interview
lasted about one and half-hours. During a two-year period, we maintained contact
with the founders and management team. The participant selection was based on
the first author’s personal networks within the IT industry in New Zealand. Her IT
work experience helped us to establish a good rapport with the senior management
of the selected IT firms. Some of the key data gathered from the interviews are
outlined in Table I.
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Insert Table I

4.2 Data analysis
Tolich and Davidson (1999) highlight how qualitative research data collection and
analysis are inextricably interwoven in a reiterative cycle of data collection,
reduction, firm and data interpretation. We conducted a multiple case study
analysis to identify similarities and differences between strategic scope, activity
configurations, business philosophies and organizational performance levels. This
in turn helped to generate a common set of characteristics that influence the
realised strategies.

After transcribing the interviews, we extracted significant statements, phrases, and
sentences that are directly related to organizational scope, activity configuration
and performance. Thereafter, we clustered these statements into a common set of
characteristics that influence the realisation of strategy types. Thus, the study was
analysed at three levels.

First, we analysed the strategy dimensions (strategic scope and activity
configurations) at individual firms. There were three logical combinations of
strategic scope and activity configurations: i) firms that pursue a very broad
strategic scope and activity configuration—realising excessively complex
strategies; ii) firms that pursue a moderate scope and activity configuration—
realising moderately simple or complex strategies; and iii) firms that pursue a very
narrow scope and activity configuration--–realising excessively simple strategies.
However, we were unable to find any firms that realised excessively simple
strategies. Based on the individual strategy dimension analysis and the grouping of
firms, we then analysed the characteristics that influenced realisation of each
strategy grouping. The second stage of the data analysis was on identifying the
characteristics that influenced the realisation of each strategy grouping. Finally, we
analysed the link between the characteristics that influence the realisation of
strategy types and the relationship between different realised strategy groups and
survival.
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In the next section, we present the findings based on a comparative case study
analysis. Due to confidentiality reasons, we created pseudo names for entrepreneurs
and firms. The nine firms were named after nine planets. There is no relationship
between the size of the planet and the firm.

5. Findings
5.1 Strategic scope and activity configuration
Jupiter and Pluto exhibit the narrowest strategic scope and activity configurations.
Both Jupiter and Pluto offer their product to a selective market/geographic scope.
These two firms purposefully make choices on the market/ industry and product
scope opportunities pursued. However, Jupiter and Pluto both did not exhibit signs
of excessive simplicity and as such, they engaged in a simple strategy that offers a
specialised product range to a niche market.

Uranus exhibits a broader product scope and a resulting activity configuration than
Pluto and Jupiter. However, Uranus offers its products to a selective
market/industry scope and realise a simple strategy. Saturn exhibits the broadest
strategic scope within the firms that realise simple strategies. It offers its core
product to a flexible geographic market. Its geographic scope varies and is
dependent on the industry network and relationships. Saturn excels in its strategic
scope and activity configuration by focussing on few activities within their resource
capabilities. However, within the next few years, due to its gradual expansion of its
strategic scope, it is possible that the company may realise a moderately complex
strategy.

Of the firms that realised a complex strategy, Mercury displays the narrowest
strategic scope and activity configuration. Although it has the narrowest strategic
scope and activity configuration within this group, the company did not realise a
moderately complex strategy or a moderately simple strategy because it was
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trapped in a strategic scope and activity configuration that was beyond its resource
capabilities. Consequently, Mercury reveals signs of excessive complexity.

Mercury acted as resellers of software products, application developers, and
managed maintenance for its clients. The firm focussed on New Zealand, UK, USA
and Australian markets. The company engaged in marketing, sales, product
development, and technical maintenance activities to cater to the strategic scope
choices. During the second year, Mercury decided to focus on the development
aspect of its product scope and manage within their resource capabilities. However,
even with the product scope trade off and mastering, the company did not have the
necessary resources to fund the operations in the four geographical markets.
Consequently, the company has now decided to engage in a narrower geographic
scope (New Zealand and Australia), offering only a specialised product scope
(software development).

Mars, Neptune and Venus all realised excessively complex strategies exhibiting a
similar level of excessively broad strategic scope and a resulting set of excessively
broad activities (similar to Mercury). All three companies developed software,
engaged in a broad geographic scope and were reliant on investor funding.
Consequently, these firms engaged in a broad set of activities encompassing
product customisation, establishing distributor networks within the diverse
geographical markets, investor funding generation activities, and sales distribution
activities.

Earth realised the most complex strategy encompassing an excessive strategic
scope and activity configuration compared to all the other firms. Earth engaged in a
broader geographic scope and yet was unable to generate the necessary level of
investor funding to sustain the range of activities. As a result, the company was not
able to specialise within any product or market/industry scope. Earth showed a lack
of trade off, lack of mastering of strategic scope and activity configuration.
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5.2 Organizational goals
There were three distinct organizational goals observed in the firms. One was a
balanced and enjoyable life style. All the firms that focused on providing the
entrepreneur and its team an enjoyable and a balanced life style realised a simple
strategy. Generally, these firms also wanted to sustain business expansion through
an incremental increase in its capabilities to sustain a manageable level of work and
business risk taking. List on the stock exchange and create shareholder wealth was
another distinct goal. Generally, listing in the stock exchange and creating wealth
for its shareholders were the key organizational goals at all the sample firms that
realised an excessively complex strategy (other than Mercury).

Other firms followed a combination of the first two goals. Pluto exhibited an
organizational goal that combined both achieving a balanced and enjoyable life
style and listing in the stock exchange or selling the company in the long term for a
profit.
5.3 Business models
There were four distinct types of business models adopted by the participating
firms. See Exhibit below:
Insert Exhibit I
Generally, all firms that realised a moderately simple strategy adopted a selffunding and self-sustaining business model. They funded their organizational
operations and expansion from internal funding; mainly from the entrepreneur and
managers’ personal capital, and sales revenue. These firms were not dependent on
external funding and reinvested most of the profits back into the firms. As such
these firms followed the philosophy of “only spending what they earn” and being
profitable at all times except during times of expansion. Similarly, these firms
ensured that they engaged in a strategic scope and a set of activities that are within
their skills and financial resources. Mercury was the only participating organisation
realising an excessively complex strategy to adopt a self-sustaining business model.
However, it is important to note that although they used internal funding for their
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operations, the company did not engage in a strategic scope and activity
configuration that was within their skills and financial resource levels.
Consequently the company was unable to sustain any form of business expansion.

All the firms that realised an excessively complex strategy adopted an external
funding based business model. These firms were dependent on external investor
funding to sustain its operations and expansion. The rationale was to use investor
funding to establish the necessary infrastructure and recruit key people. These firms
generally desired large-scale global expansion and wealth creation for its
shareholders within the first three to five years. As a consequence, the firms that
pursued this type of a business model generally undertook a range of activities and
operations that were beyond their existing resource capabilities.

Neptune adopted a business model to develop and specialise a very specific
strategic scope and activity configuration that creates a sustainable revenue
generation. Thereafter, it systematically expanded into a global software firm with
a strategic scope and activities to increase revenue generation. Pluto on the other
hand adopted a two-phase business model. During the first phase of business, the
company sustained a low fixed cost and a self-sustaining business model. It out
sourced most of its operations to reduce its fixed costs and increased the chances of
survival during the early stages. In addition, Pluto acquired skills such as financial
planning, business planning, project management, and IT support through its own
shareholders. These further reduced the cost of hiring personnel to perform these
activities. After achieving the level of expansion possible from its internal funding,
Pluto gained a selective level of investor funding to further expand the business.

The cross-case study analysis indicated that generally, all the firms that realised a
moderately simple strategy were profitable, enjoyed incremental revenue growth
and maintained or increased their employee numbers. On the contrary, all the
participating firms that realised an excessively complex strategy experienced
negative cash-flow problems, experienced downsizing, resulting in receiverships,
and being sold. Mercury was the only firm that realised an excessively complex
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strategy to realise a marginal profit. This may be because the company had a
different organizational goal and pursued a different business model than the other
firms that realised excessively complex strategy.

6. Discussion
The above findings seem to indicate two common characteristics; strategic
particularity and holistic strategic balance (see Exhibit II). These in turn influenced
the realised strategies of these firms. Next, these two common characteristics are
discussed.
Insert Exhibit II
6.1 Strategic particularity: Mastering, organizational theme and trade-off
The analysis of strategic scope and activity configuration seem to indicate that, the
firms exhibiting moderate levels of strategic scope and activities tend to portray the
qualities of mastering, cohesive organizational theme, and make purposeful
choices. Mastering occurs when firms develop a distinctive competence, requiring
dedication and passionate single mindedness (Peters and Waterman, 1982; Porter,
1980). The mastering component may contain ‘employee knowledge and skills,
technical systems, managerial systems, values and norms’ which could be the core
capabilities (Leonard-Barton, 1992) or what are called distinctive competencies
(Hitt and Ireland, 1985) of a firm.

Jupiter, Uranus, Pluto and Saturn all illustrated the distinctive quality of mastering.
All of these firms formulated and brought together their employee
knowledge/skills, technical systems, managerial systems, and values/norms with
dedication to enable their individual companies to become masters in their core
offering. Consequently, these firms seem to have a core offering that is valuable,
rare, inimitable and organizational specific (Barney, 1997).

However, the firms that did not show the existence of mastering appear to have
faced negative consequences. For example, Miller indicated that “middle of the

12

road strategies may be anathema to competitive advantage – the jack-of-all-trades
is too often master of none” (1992b: 49). Similarly, Porter (1985:16) agreed by
saying that “a firm that engages in each generic strategy but fails to achieve any of
them is stuck in the middle”. This lack of mastering is visible in firms that had
realised an excessively complex strategy. For example, firms like Venus and Earth
were engaged in a broad geographic scope, a broad product scope, and a related
broad set of activities, which resulted in them not being able to cultivate the quality
of mastering within any product offering/market.

This quality of mastering appears to be a core concept highlighted in the book –
‘Crossing the Chasm’ by Moore (1991). Accordingly, Moore (1991: 66) prescribes
IT firms to,
“…cross the chasm by targeting a very specific niche market where
you can dominate from the outset, force your competitors out of that
market niche, and then use it as a base for broader operations”
Moore (1991:68) says that generally sales driven firms are not willing to “adopt
any discipline that would ever require a firm to stop pursuing any sale at any time
for any reason”. When this occurs, the firms can become less market driven and
decrease its survival chances in the long run (Moore, 1991).

Although Neptune ’s founder initially based the company business formula around
the philosophy prescribed by Moore (1991), it actually realised what Moore (1991)
prescribed firms not to do; pursuing any sale at any time for any reason. As a result,
Neptune is engaged in a broad strategic scope (catering to a diverse range of
industries such as gaming, telecommunication, finance, retail, Internet and
healthcare) requiring a broad set of activities. Neptune as indicated by Moore
(1991) operated in diverse industries by “chasing all possible sales opportunities”
in the market. However, as a result, the company has reduced its mastering in the
strategic approach by diluting their resource capabilities.

The quality of organizational theme can be defined as consciously developing and
articulating (seeks consensus on) an internal organizational image (Miles, Snow,
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Meyer & Coleman, 1978: 28). This can be achieved at firms through developing
“powerful, ideologically embedded priorities that pervade an organization,
impelling its people to embrace consistent values and purposes” (Miller and
Whitney, 1999: 7). It is this form of theme that is prevalent in Jupiter , Pluto ,
Saturn and Uranus . These firms portray a set of priorities that illustrate a selfsustaining value system, a need to specialise in a core offering, prioritising on
relationship marketing, making work enjoyable, and the desire for balance in their
personal life.

Firms that “have no powerful unifying focus that gives them uniqueness, spirit and
direction” lack profound character (Miller and Whitney, 1999: 5). For example at
AT&T, “the absence of a core theme or a clear set of priorities seems to have
prevented the corporation from excelling at any one business or function” (Miller
and Whitney, 1999: 6). This lack of core theme may be because, “AT&T has
pursued too many paths, none with great conviction or distinction” (Miller and
Whitney, 1999: 6). Similarly, Earth pursued too many paths without much
conviction and consequently over stretched itself and went into receivership.

Neptune, on the other hand, had a value system that did not suit current market
needs. For example, up until recently the company was managed by its original
software developers/founders. They were very “product and sales oriented” and did
not understand the mass-market needs and competition. Consequently, the founders
created a “crisis oriented management culture” where the company attempted to
gain any sale to survive in the short term. It expended high levels of resources on
product development and customisation of products to suit individual clients. As a
result, the company was unable to attain a suitable return on their investment.
According to Moore (1991: 68), “the consequences of being sales-driven during the
chasm period are put it simply, fatal”. This seems to indicate that not only should
an organization have a core value system that binds the company together, but the
theme should also be market driven and evolved to match the market development
needs.
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The quality of trade off can be best illustrated by Porter who notes, “becoming
stuck in the middle is often a manifestation of a firm’s unwillingness to make
choices” (1985: 17). Therefore, firms need to “deliberately choose a different set of
activities to deliver a unique mix of value” (Porter, 1996: 64). When firms do not
make such a deliberate choice, such firms may pursue “diverse range of activities
and a broad scope that may result in loosing sight of what business they are in”
(Baden-Fuller & Stopford, 1994: 175). This is further emphasised when Miller
(1992b: 31) says “To do any thing really well requires giving some thing up.
Because there is within us only so much talent and energy, it must be focussed for
maximum effect”.

Firms such as Earth, Venus and Mars showed unwillingness to make choices and as
a result got into a diverse range of activities and a broad strategic scope blurring
their core business offering. On the other hand, Jupiter, Saturn, Pluto and Uranus
continue to make clear choices on strategic scope and activity configuration and
manage to evolve their core offering to suit the changing market needs. Similarly,
with time all these firms took steps to increase their strategic scope (either product
or market/industry) to suit their enhanced skills and resource levels.

In sum, the above analyses indicate that the firms that realised a moderately simple
strategy realised moderate strategic particularity, while firms that realised an
excessively complex strategy showed lack of strategic particularity. Although the
findings did not identify any firm that realised excessive levels of strategic
particularity, it is possible that some other group of firms may realise excessive
levels of strategic particularity. Next we examine this aspect.

6.2 Holistic strategic balance
The findings suggest that the presence of strategic particularity appears to have an
impact on a firm’s overall strategic balance. The element of mastering, purposeful
trade-offs and organizational themes in firms like Jupiter, Saturn, Pluto and Uranus
enabled them to ensure that they do not enter into excessive scope levels and pursue
an excessively complex set of activities that cannot be supported by their existing
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resource and skill levels. Miller (1992b: 26) says that outstanding corporations “are
a bit like beautiful poems or sonatas - their parts or elements fit together
harmoniously to express a theme”. He (ibid) identified such a balance at ITT where
their cast of players (human, ideological strategic and structural) “complemented
each other and were essential to the enactment of the play”. Tichy highlights a
similar internal perspective (1983: 55), when pointing out that strategic balance is a
result of a “high level of interdependence and integration between the technical,
political and cultural systems at work”.

This form of strategic balance was present in four of the nine firms. Saturn had a
consistent theme of self-sustaining philosophy running through the firm. It
purposely made a choice on what activities and scope they wanted to engage in. As
a result, the company was able to balance the level of scope and activities with
organizational resource capabilities to realise holistic strategic balance. Jupiter
purposely wanted to maintain a limit in the strategic scope and activities it engaged
in to retain a manageable level of risk. As such, there was an apparent coherence
between the strategic scope and activity configuration in relation to its
organizational financial and human resource capabilities. Pluto managed to
maintain a low-cost operational structure and a complementary self-sustaining
business philosophy. Consequently, it has been able to create a balance between its
internal resource capabilities and realised strategy strategic scope/activity
configuration. Lastly, Uranus is another firm where its “parts or elements fit
together harmoniously to express a theme”. It engages in a strategic scope and a set
of activities that complement each other to realise a holistic strategic balance.

As such, it is evident that the realised strategic scope and activities of the individual
firms complemented each other at Jupiter, Uranus, Pluto and Saturn. Similarly, the
value systems and activities of these firms were all essential to the overall strategic
performance. All of these firms showed a high level of integration and
interdependence amongst the organizational activities. In contrast, there was a
visible lack of interdependence and integration between the internal elements,
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activities, and value systems at Venus, Mars, and Earth. Consequently, these firms
indicated the non-existence of holistic strategic balance as elaborated below.

Neptune is unable to achieve a balance between its strategic scope, activity
configuration and its organizational capabilities. This is because it engages in a
high level of customisation within a broad geographic/industry scope resulting in
high overseas operational costs that is beyond its existing financial resource
capabilities. As such, the company is still struggling to create integration between
the technical, political and cultural systems that would be essential to realise
holistic strategic balance.

Venus is still pursuing an excessively complex strategy, even though it had
attempted to reduce its level of complexity in the activities and the strategic scope.
Consequently, the company has not yet managed to fit its activities and strategic
scope together harmoniously to express a theme and achieve an organizational
balance between the existing resource capabilities, and the strategic scope and
activity configuration. As a result, Venus continues to struggle for its survival and
is still a long way from achieving its organizational goal – listing in the stock
exchange as a profitable IT firm.

Earth continued to cater to a broad market/industry scope that required a broad
range of activities. Three years after re-launching, Earth was liquidated, as it was
unable to achieve a balance between the organizational strategic scope/activity
configuration and its resource capabilities.

Mercury was the only firm that followed a self-sustaining business philosophy to
realise an excessively complex strategy. This may be because the company pursued
an excessively broad geographic scope and a set of activities that was beyond their
resource capabilities. As such, the company was unable to complement its internal
activities to realise holistic strategic balance. Nevertheless, the company has now
shifted to pursue a moderately simple strategy that encompasses a geographic scope
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and a set of activities that is within their resource capabilities and thus continue to
be a profitable entity.

Mars did portray some form of mastering and purposeful focus on product scope.
However, it seemed to have pursued a geographic scope that was beyond its
organizational capabilities. Therefore, the company was not able to achieve an
organizational balance between the available resource capabilities (investor
funding), and the pursued product and market/geographic scope strategy. After
Mars was bought out, the Australian principal refocused to cater only to
Australian/New Zealand geographic scope. Thereby, the Australian principals
intentionally created a balance between the pursued strategy (market/industry and
product scope) and financial resource capabilities. Today, the company continues to
operate successfully within this business model.

7. Conclusion
Any implications drawn from this research should be accompanied with caution.
Drawing conclusions about the characteristics of IT start-up firms based only on
nine New Zealand start up IT firms is a process fraught with potential hazards. The
present study was based from a leaders’ perspective. There is a need for a similar
study on a larger sample of business leaders from start up IT companies. These
leaders could be drawn from different cultural settings, industry segments and at
differing levels of market, product and organizational life stages. Future research
could compare the findings of this study from other stakeholders’ perspectives—
such as non-executive employees, shareholders, customers and suppliers.

Despite these limitations, the findings of this study indicate the importance of
balancing strategic capabilities with the realised organizational strategy (strategic
scope and activity configuration). Jupiter, Uranus, Pluto and Saturn all followed the
principle “spend only what you earn” and “engaged in activities and a strategic
scope that is within its skill and resource capability levels”. However, all four firms
built their resource capability and skill levels, and subsequently expanded their
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strategic scope and activity levels to create evolving levels of holistic balance that
indicated consistent, self-sustaining organizational growth levels.

In contrast, Earth, Venus, Neptune and Mars adopted the opposite business
philosophy. They pursued a strategic scope and a set of activities that was beyond
their resource capabilities. These firms failed to realise the need for balancing
actual resource and skill capabilities with their strategy (strategic scope and activity
configuration). Instead, these firms based their strategic scope and activity
decisions on forecasted external financial funding. Therefore, these firms struggled
to create a balance in their overall strategy and faced negative or fluctuating
performance repercussions.
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Exhibit I: Organizational Performance and Business Model Adopted by IT start up Organizations
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Earth
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External Funding

Exhibit II: Strategic Dimensions and Characteristics of Strategy groupings
No balance and excessive strategic complexity
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